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Introduction
Software diversity has been advocated as a means of improving the reliability of safety related software and in particular safety systems that react to a demand, where a 1 out of 2 or a 2 out of 3 voting scheme can be used to ensure that some safety action is performed. This approach is used in industry (e.g. for railway interlocking), but development and maintenance is costlier than for a non-diverse system and it is not easy to predict in advance the likely safety improvement that can be achieved. Theory as well as experimental studies indicate that failures of diverse implementations ("versions") are not necessarily independent [3, 7, 15] . The challenge is to determine how much improvement should be expected with diversity. Early theoretical work by Eckhardt and Lee [4] showed that variations in the degree of "difficulty" for different inputs (or "demands") will result in the expected pfd for a pair of diverse programs being greater than the product of the expected pfds of the two programs and thus limit the effectiveness of diversity. Littlewood and Miller [8] later showed that, if diversity in development results in different "difficulty functions" for the two diverse programs, the expected pfd for common failures of a diverse pair can also be less than the product of the expected pfds of the single versions.
To quantify via these theories the improvement in expected pfd for a diverse safety system, one would need to specify both the difficulty for every demand, and the demand profile. Difficulty functions will normally be impossible to estimate for real projects (although a posteriori difficulty estimates have been obtained [1, 15] for some "toy" applications where many different versions were developed [12] ). In addition, if the safety system is used in different operational contexts, the demand profile might also be different and this can change the expected pfds.
In this paper we examine an approach for a more modest, but still useful, goal of estimating the worst case improvement in average pfd, by deriving a worst case demand profile that only requires knowledge about two points on the difficulty function rather that characterizing the whole function.
The paper will first summarize the theory underlying the difficulty function, then identify the worst demand profile that maximizes the expected pfd for a pair of diverse programs, relative to the expected pfd of a single version for a given difficulty function. We then consider what estimates for the expected pfd can be derived given different types of knowledge about the difficulty function. We also discuss means, and difficulties, for estimating the model parameters and tentatively suggest an approach for systems implemented as logic networks.
2
The difficulty function
In these models, the process that delivers a program, with its unknown faults (if any), is modelled as the random sampling of a program from a "population of all possible programs". The (unknown) probability of "drawing" each specific possible program depends on the specification, the development process, the development team, etc. Given these factors, the "difficulty function" θ(x) is defined as the probability that such a "randomly drawn" program will fail on a given demand x.
The mean pfds of a single program (pfd 1 ) and of common failure for a pair of diverse programs (pfd 2 ) depend on the difficulty function θ(x) and the demand profile p(x). For a difficulty function θ(x), the expected pfd of a single program version is:
We consider the case in which the two versions for a 1-out-of-2 system are developed from the same process for the same specification: the two developments have the same "difficulty function" (Eckhardt and Lee model [4] ). Thus pfd 1 is the same for both programs; among all the scenarios where this holds, this scenario, of identical difficulty functions, yields the highest (i.e., the worst) value of pfd 2 .
Assuming conditional independence between failures of the versions for each demand [4] (i.e., the two developments are independent [11] ), the expected pfd for a randomly drawn pair of programs is then:
pfd 2 increases with the variance of the difficulty function θ(x). Intuitively, if the difficulty function is very "spiky", there is a high probability that the diverse programs will fail on the same, "difficult" demands: the average benefit from diverse programs will be lower than otherwise. Conversely if the difficulty function is "flat" (the same value for all demands), there is nothing that forces the diverse programs to fail on similar inputs, so the gain in average reliability is higher. In this case, pfd 2 does equal the product between the expected pfd values for the two versions. For brevity, when this equality holds we will say there is "independence on average"
1 . Clearly the mean pfd depends upon the demand profile p(x) as well as the demand difficulty θ(x). In the next section we use this dependence on the demand profile to derive the worst case value of pfd 2 for a given value of pfd 1 .
3
Estimating the worst case expected pfd
We compare the expected pfd for this system with that of a single-version (i.e., non-diverse) system used in the same function (hence with the same demand profile).
To determine the worst-case impact of the profile on the expected pfd, we choose the family of the most extreme profiles possible: the ones in which the only demand values with non-zero probabilities are x=hi and x=lo that have the highest and lowest values of the difficulty function, θ(hi) and θ(lo). For this profile, we can write:
where z = p(lo) and (1−z) = p(hi). So pfd 1 and pfd 2 can vary between their minimum and maximum values depending on z, i.e.: min(pfd 2 ) = θ(lo)
No other profile can achieve this range, as non-zero probabilities for demands with intermediate θ values would reduce the maximum and increase the minimum value achievable. There is also another sense in which these profiles are "extreme". Given a certain difficulty function, a given value of pfd 1 can in general be the result of many different profiles, only one of which is "extreme" 2 . This "extreme" profile is the one 1 We underscore that "independence on average" is a property of expected values, not of individual program pairs. If independence of failures held for every pair of diverse programs, "independence on average" would also hold. However, "independence on average" could hold even if independence does not hold within each pair; and we can have pfd 2 >pfd 1 2 even in a population of pairs in which pairs with negative or zero correlation between failures of their component versions are more common than pairs with positive correlation [10] . 2 To be precise, we should consider the cases in which more than one demand values have values of θ equal to θ(hi) (or equal to θ(lo)). The reasoning presented here remains valid: we can treat all the demands with an identical value of θ as one demand.
where pfd 2 is largest, i.e., the advantage of diversity is smallest. Under this profile, the expected pfd of a diverse pair, pfd 2 , is a linear combination of θ(lo) 2 and θ(hi) 2 and hence a linear combination of (min pfd 1 ) 2 and (max pfd 1 ) 2 . This can be compared with the "best case" profile that only selects demands x with exactly the same difficulty, i.e. where θ(x)=pfd 1 , so from (2) that pfd 2 To understand this graph, we consider that for a given value of θ(lo), the lowest possible value of pfd 1 is θ(lo), given by setting z=0 in equation (3), and the corresponding value of pfd 2 equals θ(lo) 2 (equation 4). This is why the straight lines for θ(lo)=0.01 and θ(lo)=0.02 do not continue to the left of these points. The maximum values of pfd 1 and pfd 2 are given by setting z=1, and correspond to the rightmost point in the graph, pfd 1 =θ(hi), pfd 2 =θ(hi) 2 . All the intermediate "extreme" profiles for the same values of θ(lo) and θ(hi) give the {pfd 1 , pfd 2 } pairs represented by the points of the straight line joining these maximum and minimum points on the pfd 1 2 curve.
We now study the effects of various levels of knowledge about θ(hi) and θ(lo).
3.1
Case where θ(hi) and θ(lo) are known When θ(hi) and θ(lo) are known, the endpoints of the linear combination are known and changing z changes the ratio of pfd 2 to pfd 1 , since from equation (3) We note that if pfd 1 =θ(lo) or pfd 1 =θ(hi), then pfd 2 = pfd 1 2 . This is not surprising: these cases select profiles where all points have the same difficulty value: effectively a flat difficulty function, which is known to imply "independence on average". It also follows that the reduction factor pfd 2 /pfd 1 will vary between θ(lo) and θ(hi).
Case where only θ(hi) is known
If θ(lo) is unknown, then the worst case assumption is that θ(lo) = 0, and hence equation (7) reduces to the following, known bound on pfd 2 :
3.3
Case where θ(hi) and θ(lo) are not known
The worst case assumption is now θ(lo) = 0, θ(hi) = 1 and hence equation (8) reduces to the extreme case where the bound is: 1 2 pfd pfd ≤ (9) In this case, the mean pfd of a diverse pair could be no better than that for a single version. The worst case -the equality in (9) holds -would mean that the programs developed have fail on some specific demands and no others (with probability 1). Comparison with the previous cases highlights how knowledge about the difficulty function allows us to reduce the mean value of pfd 2 as a proportion of pfd 1 .
3.4
Case where the ratio between θ(hi) and θ(lo) is known
In this case we only know the maximum "roughness" of the difficulty function, k, the ratio of θ(hi) to θ(lo), but not the absolute difficulty values. Hence ) (
In this model, there is no constraint on the x axis endpoints θ(hi) and θ(lo) apart from the ratio k (and the fact that 0≤θ(lo)≤pfd 1 ≤θ(hi)≤1). The worst case value of pfd 2 lies on the chord between the two endpoints: as illustrated in Fig. 2 below.
Fig. 2. Worst case given a known difficulty ratio k
To get the worst case for a given pfd 1 , we effectively slide the linear combination chord for pfd 2 along the pfd 1 2 curve, while keeping the ratio between the endpoints of the chord (on the pfd 1 axis) equal to k. Then we choose the chord that gives maximum (worst) possible value of pfd 2 for a given value of pfd 1 . Since pfd 1 is held constant, maximizing the ratio pfd 2 /pfd 1 also maximizes pfd 2 /pfd 1 2 (the worst case increase relative to independence on average). The analysis in Appendix A shows that pfd 2 is bounded by:
So the worst case reduction factor for pfd 2 relative to pfd 1 is pfd 1 ⋅(k+1) 2 /4k, rather than the factor of pfd 1 that would result from "independence on average". This worst case bound equation is only applicable up to the point where θ(hi)=1 (as we cannot slide the pfd 2 chord any further to the right). From the analysis in Appendix A, it can be shown that this limit is reached when: (12) If pfd 1 exceeds this constraint, a variant of equation (7) has to be used instead where θ(hi)=1 and θ(lo)=1/k, i.e.: The difficulty "roughness" parameter, k, could be a very large value or even infinity if θ(lo)=0. Thus to forecast a good (low) worst-case pfd 2 we need θ(hi) to be not too high; counter-intuitively, we also need θ(lo) not to be too low: we need evidence that the probability of faults affecting any one demand will be "bad enough".
Numerical illustration
For some non-realistic programs, we have empirical difficulty data derived from an analysis of program versions from an archive of mathematical problems and solutions [12] . Analysis of a population of around 3000 initial releases of program versions for a relatively simple problem [1] yielded the difficulty surface (taking the observed frequencies as estimates of probabilities) shown in Fig. 3 below. Inserting these values into equations 7, 8 and 9, the relationship between these bounding equations is illustrated in Fig. 4 .
The bound based on knowledge of both θ(hi) and θ(lo) (equation 7) represents the least pessimistic worst case bound on pfd 2 . It can be seen that the curve based on an estimate of k (equation 9) touches the least conservative bound line at the maximum dependency point when pfd 1 = 0.140 (see Appendix A for details). Unlike equation 7, equation 9 allows the maximum dependency point that defines pfd 2 to be shifted if a new estimate of pfd 1 is made. This is equivalent to defining new values for θ(hi) and θ(lo) which retain the same ratio k.
The pfd 2 bound based on θ(hi) alone (equation 8) tends to be the most pessimistic, although it does intersect with the least conservative bound when pfd 1 = θ(hi) 
Parameter estimation
In the analysis above we have identified alternative ways of deriving a worst case value for pfd 2 given pfd 1 by using different kinds of information about the difficulty function. To apply these models for prediction, as opposed to generic insight, we require realistic model parameters. At the current state of knowledge, there are no means for deriving credible difficulty values to support prediction (estimation of expected pfd) for a specific safety application. In the following subsections we examine some potential directions for deriving model parameters, and difficulties to be overcome for them to become applicable in the future.
Estimating k
Estimation of k could be based on relative complexity, if one assumed the demand difficulty for demand x proportional to some measure of demand logic complexity 3 ,
where c(x) is a measure of the logic complexity required to process a given demand x. For example, the complexity measure could based on the number of lines of code or number of decision points in the code involved in a particular type of demand. Program analysis (such as code pruning) could be used to identify the relevant subset of code involved with each demand. Assuming such complexity measures can be derived, k would be estimated as:
This approach need not be restricted to conventional code. Many safety systems are represented as logic networks with a set of interconnected logic gates. Each type of demand requires different logic and sensor inputs to respond to different safetyrelated incidents on the associated plant. The complexity of the logic network could be used to estimate c(x).
Estimating θ(hi) and θ(lo)
One means of estimating θ(hi) is to make use of the fact that, by definition:
where p faulty is the probability that a program selected from the population of all possible program versions is faulty. The value of p faulty could be estimated via a range of methods including an analysis of the development process [2] and the level of test coverage achieved [9] , however they are not mature methods and confidence in their predictions will be especially low when few faults are expected to be present.
Alternatively, estimates of θ(x) could be made directly based on some expected fault density f [13] and an estimate of the amount of code or logic n(x) needed to respond to a particular demand. There can be many demands x that exercise the same logic, but if we make a (strong) assumption that all demands are equally likely to fail if the logic is faulty (on average over the whole population), then:
So the maximum and minimum values of n(x) over all types of demand x can be used to obtain θ(hi) and θ(lo).
Empirical data analysis
Data sets that can be used for empirical parameter estimation are quite limited, but there is survey of programmable logic controller (PLC) logic faults undertaken for the UK Health and Safety Executive [14] . Such PLCs are not programmed using conventional code but as an interconnected set of logic elements (like AND, OR, NOT) or relay "coils" (that simulate the behavior of hardware relays). Field reliability data was collected from a range of industrial applications from the nuclear, chemical, oil and gas and electrical industrial sectors (but predominantly nuclear). A full set of data was collected for 125 PLCs which included the number of:
No PLC "platform" failures were recorded in over 600 PLC-years of operation, suggesting that PLC platforms are fairly reliable. We should also note that "coils" were used as the measure of the number of logic elements, but we cannot be sure the actual logic network contained coils or whether an "equivalent coils" estimate was calculated for alternative types of logic. In addition, the term "failures" in this data set might actually be a misnomer for "number of faults", as the failure counts are typically zero or one. We assumed "failures" indicate the number of different faults. This is conservative from the viewpoint of estimating maximum difficulty as it can only over-estimate the number of network logic faults. Furthermore, if over-estimation of faults were consistent, it would not affect the k ratio derived in Section 3.4.
On further analysis, we found that some of the PLCs contained identical logic network metrics and identical fault counts. This was interpreted to mean that the same logic network was installed on multiple PLCs, which could bias the result by counting the same logic network several times over. These duplicates were eliminated from the analysis, leaving size and fault data for 96 different PLC programs. The results are presented in Fig. 5 below. As the fault data are relatively sparse, the graph presents a cumulative count of faults versus the number of "coils". The summation is performed in program size order, as this will reveal a non-linear relationship between PLC program size and faults by an increasing or decreasing gradient. As can be seen in Fig. 5 , the relation-ship does appear to be roughly linear (to 95% in a chi-squared test). Perhaps surprisingly, the slope seems to be slightly less for the larger PLC programs (at the right hand side of the graph).
A very similar graph was obtained when we used the sum of inputs and outputs (io) as the network size measure. Again, the correlation is better than 95% in a chisquared test.
Given the evidence of a linear relationship between network size and logic faults, it may be legitimate to use an average fault density to estimate the number of faults in a logic network. The logic density estimates derived from the linear regression analysis of faults against the coil and io measures are shown in Table 1 below. Some caveats need to be placed on these fault density estimates, notably:
• The fault density is based on the number of fault discovered which could be an underestimate if some of the faults have yet to be found. The data in [14] shows the mean operating time is 5.9 years. It is not certain that all defects would have been detected over that period of time.
• Given the sparseness of failure data it cannot be demonstrated that linearity applies over the whole range of complexity. If the density is lower for small logic subsystems, k would be larger than predicted under the linearity assumption.
• We do not know which of the PLC faults were caused by errors in user requirements or implementation. Common user requirement flaws cannot be mitigated by diverse logic implementations. Section 6 provides an example where we assume the fault density estimates relate to diverse implementation faults.
• Fault density figures will differ depending on the application type and safety criticality.
So the empirically derived figures might be viewed as indicative "ball-park" figures, but should not be viewed as being applicable to a specific diverse system.
6
Example application
The application of the fault density quantification approach outlined in Section 5 is illustrated on an actual industrial safety system with two independent safety trains that control functionally diverse plant shutdown mechanisms 4 . The A and B train subsystems and logic element counts (taken from the logic specification sheets) are shown in Table 2 below. We will use the data to illustrate the mean pfd estimation approach, using arbitrary (and quite extreme) assumptions about the variation of logic use with demands. Let us assume some logic subsystems are unnecessary for some demands. For example a standby electrical supply subsystem might be essential if connection to the grid power supply is lost but not otherwise.
So the extreme level of variation in number of subsystems with demand might be:
• One (the smallest) logic subsystem in A and B • All logic subsystems in A and B
Using the io complexity measure we set an upper bound on the difficulty for a logic sub-network x containing n io (x) io elements as:
Based on the n io (x) numbers assumed for the assumed maximum and minimum logic networks needed for a demand we derive the bounding values for θ and k shown in Table 3 below. Note that, in this particular example, the specified logic differs between trains A and B, so we are assuming that there are no common specification flaws and the difficulty values estimate the likelihood of implementation flaws only. For the A and B trains, different logic is involved, so the values are not identical, but we conservatively assume the worst case value applies to both trains. In the following calculation, we assume that the expected value pfd 1 is 10 -2 for each train. This is combined with the bound formulae for pfd 2 from Section 3 and the worst case values in 13   Table 3 above to yield the bounds on the expected value of pfd 2 shown in Table 4 below. 
Discussion
It should be noted that the analysis in this paper relates to expected values. The analysis seeks to estimate the improvement we might expect between the averages pfd 1 and pfd 2 by using diversity, under worst case assumptions about the operational profile. It does not predict the improvement ratio that will actually be achieved by a specific pair of program versions under a specific operational profile-clearly the actual reduction achieved could be better or worse than a model based on averages [10] .
It is also important to note that this analysis describes the effects of those parts of development that are indeed diverse. For example, if there is a common specification, the possibility of a specification flaw would invalidate the conditional independence assumption required in the Eckhardt and Lee model [4] . Accounting for such common factors requires more complex models [11] and we have not checked how the approach would extend to those models.
The paper also explores possible directions for quantifying the model parameters. The analysis of PLC failure data in Section 5 illustrates how one might attempt to estimate ranges of difficulty. However the method discussed should be viewed as "work in progress", as it has not been validated or substantiated. In particular:
• It assumes that difficulty can be estimated from predicted fault density. This is not supported by deduction and could only be validated experimentally.
• There is an assumption of linearity between logic complexity and logic faults. This is not contradicted by the available empirical data but it would require far more empirical data to validate the assumption over the whole range of complexity.
• There are no fault density and complexity data for systems of higher criticality, so we have no support for an assumption of linearity for such systems, and we cannot derive "typical" fault density figures for such systems.
Clearly further empirical studies are needed to check the underlying assumptions and to derive realistic faults density values before the models can be applied to high criticality systems. For validating this approach to estimating the difficulty function, the main obstacle is that direct empirical assessment of difficulty functions means counting faults affecting each demand in a large population of programs developed independently for the same specification. The rarity of such populations, outside laboratory experiments on toy problems, is the usual problem in empirical software engineering. Given instead sets of realistic, but practically unique programs, a feasible form of weaker validation would be to select sets of programs that are assessed to have the same parameters for the estimation method used, and then, within such a set of programs, measure fault frequencies over sets of demands estimated to have the same difficulty.
More generally, the current models assume a common difficulty function and further work is needed to generalize this approach to the case where the difficulty functions differ for the two versions (the Littlewood and Miller model [8] ).
We also note that these bounding methods also apply to the models by Hughes [6] that explain correlation between random failures in redundant hardware in terms of variation of failure rates with environmental stress. Variation of failure rates with environmental factors will typically be easier to assess than variation of difficulty between demands. This can be used the set the worst case value of pfd 2 relative to pfd 1 2 , i.e. 
